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Bluetooth is a de facto standard feature in mobile 
devices such as smart phones, PDAs and similar 
devices.  While this provides great convenience to the 
user, there are a number of security issues for which 
exploits are widely available.  This fact, combined with 
the growing sophistication of devices, creates the 
potential for serious loss in the event of a security 
breach.  This paper investigates the use of Bluetooth 
profiles by the public and finds that some potentially 
high-risk profiles are not widely used.  A subsequent 
investigation of a number of devices determined that 
no way of configuring individual profiles was 
available.  The paper concludes with a 
recommendation that devices allow users to configure 





Bluetooth is a system for short-range wireless 
communication and is intended to allow devices within 
physical proximity of each other to communicate.  As 
it is becoming universal among mobile devices, and as 
almost everybody has a mobile device, most people 
have a Bluetooth device in their possession most of the 
time. 
The prevalence of Bluetooth devices makes possible 
a wide range of applications, such as proximity-based 
location services [1], mobile commerce applications 
such as ‘eWallets’ [2], and even triggering face-to-face 
interactions that would not otherwise occur [3]. 
However, as has been the experience with Internet-
based e-commerce [4], the development of such 
applications would be hindered by problems with the 
underlying Bluetooth communication medium.  
Security problems, either real or perceived, can be a 
significant barrier to new technologies as they 
contribute to people’s reluctance to use such systems.   
This paper reports on a potentially serious – yet 
easily rectified – security issue with Bluetooth 
implementations in a wide range of mobile devices. 
 
2. Security of Bluetooth profiles 
 
Communication between Bluetooth devices is 
governed by profiles.  These can be considered as use-
cases, and essentially define parameters for the various 
protocols at different layers in the Bluetooth protocol 
stack to enable particular applications.  Some profiles 
provide specialised applications and build on the 
services provided by more general profiles; 
consequently, profiles can be considered as 
hierarchical with dependencies existing between 
different layers of the hierarchy. 
While some profiles provide only limited scope for 
security breaches, compromising others could 
potentially be very serious.  For example, the 
Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP) provides 
a wireless audio service that typically supports 
‘walkman’ functionality; if it were compromised the 
consequences would not be particularly severe in most 
cases.  On the other hand, profiles such as Dial-up 
Networking (DUN) or SIM Access Profile (SAP) 
could potentially allow the attacker to access network 
services at the expense of the device owner, and 
compromising Serial Port Profile (SPP) or Generic 
Object Exchange Profile (GOEP) could lead to 
disclosure of confidential data stored on the device.  
With the increasing prevalence of ‘smart phones’, 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), Blackberries and 
similar devices – with large storage capacities and 
access to a wide range of network services – comes a 
growing risk of damage as a result of these latter 
security breaches.   
Services implemented using these profiles can be 
advertised using Service Discovery Protocol (SDP), 
itself based on Service Discovery Application Profile 
(SDAP) and which is becoming increasingly 
widespread.  SDP is a client-server protocol that allows 
Bluetooth devices to browse the services offered by 
other devices or to search for specific services.  
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Although the standard does allow for authentication, 
this is optional and SDP is typically not authenticated.  
Consequently, it is possible to remotely determine the 
profiles available on practically any Bluetooth device 
that supports SDP.  
Where Bluetooth profiles are authenticated, this is 
typically provided by a PIN (Personal Identification 
Number), raising significant security concerns.  
Although the Bluetooth standard suggests that there 
should be ever-increasing delays between PIN attempts 
to defeat brute-force cracking, this can easily be 
circumvented by the attacker changing their Bluetooth 
address between each attempt [5].  Further, Bluetooth 
PINs can often be cracked in less than a second after 
eavesdropping the Bluetooth pairing process [6].  For 
these reasons, and given that the majority of Bluetooth 
PINs are four-digit numbers – despite the standard 
permitting up to 16 digits being used – Bluetooth PIN 
authentication should not be regarded as secure. 
The security risk posed by Bluetooth is not just 
theoretical; a growing number of tools to carry out 
attacks can be obtained easily from the Internet, some 
of which are described in Table 1. 
Compounding the risk, a number of research 
projects have demonstrated that potentially insecure 
Bluetooth devices can commonly be found in urban 
areas [7, 8, 9, 10, 11].  Further, such devices are often 
within range for sufficient time for attacks to be carried 
out [7]. 
Clearly, then, there is widespread potential for 
damage such as information or service theft.  A wide 
range of profiles is advertised by many devices and it 
seems likely that in some cases these services are not 
actually used.  For example, consider the hypothetical 
scenario of a user who enables Bluetooth in order to 
use a Bluetooth headset, and in doing so enables a 
range of other services that they never use.  This 
creates an unnecessary security risk to the user for no 
benefit whatsoever. 
In order to determine the proportion of people 
exposed to this risk, this paper reports results of a web-
based survey to determine which Bluetooth services 
are actually used by device owners.  The survey was 
composed of two sections; the first obtained 
demographic details and whether the respondent used 
Bluetooth; if Bluetooth was used, the respondent was 
prompted with questions from the second section to 
obtain data about how Bluetooth was used.  Note that 
the second section did not refer to specific Bluetooth 
profiles, but rather asked users about which actions 
they performed using Bluetooth.  This was done for 
two reasons: first, most respondents would be unlikely 
to understand technical profile names such as “Object 
Push Profile”.  Second, there is considerable similarity 
between various profiles; for example, Hands-Free 
Profile and Headset Profile both provide the user with 
much the same functionality, albeit via different 
implementations.  A list of the actions assessed by the 
survey is provided in Table 2. 
 





The most common form of this attack 
is known as BlueSnarfing.  Examples 
of software to conduct these attacks 
are Bloover, which attacks phones 
supporting J2ME, and HeloMoto, 
which attacks some Motorola V-
Series phones.  Further, many attacks 
can be devised using the standard 
tools available in Linux. 
Service theft Using the victim’s device to access 
network services such as telephony or 
SMS.  An example of this attack is 
the Mosquito virus, which sends SMS 
messages from the victim’s device. 
Denial of 
service 
Deliberately consuming resources on 
the victim’s device so as to prevent 
legitimate use.  An example is the 
BlueSmack tool, which can 
immediately disable a range of 
Bluetooth devices. 
BlueJacking BlueJacking involves sending short, 
unsolicited messages to the target 
device.  While not particularly 
serious, this attack could potentially 
be used to over-write information in 
the victim’s phonebook.  BlueJack is 
also the name of a tool commonly 
used to perform this kind of attack. 
BluePrinting Tools such as BlueStumbler, 
RedFang and BluePrint can be used 
to identify details such as the make, 
model and unique address of a 
Bluetooth device.  While not an 
attack in itself, identifying these 
details can facilitate subsequent 
attacks of other types. 
BlueBugging In BlueBug attacks the attacker 
creates a serial connection to the 
victim’s device without the need for 
authentication.  The connection can 
subsequently be used to conduct 
information and service theft attacks.  
Many tools can be used to conduct 
this kind of attack, including Gnokii, 




Table 2. Bluetooth actions assessed by the 
survey 
Synchronising contact, calendar or email data 
between my mobile/cell phone and PC 
Connecting a wireless headset to my mobile/cell 
phone 
Using my mobile/cell phone with a car kit 
Uploading files to my mobile/cell phone via 
Bluetooth 
Downloading files from my mobile/cell phone via 
Bluetooth 
Using my mobile/cell phone as a dial-up modem 
Using my mobile/cell phone to send faxes 
Using my mobile/cell phone as a portable media or 
MP3 player 




The survey attracted 123 responses, the vast 
majority of whom (78%) were between the ages of 20 
and 39.  Responses were received from 14 countries, 
however just over half of the responses (54%) were 
received from Australia.  Chi-squared testing revealed 
no significant difference between Australian and other 
responses (χ2 = 3.551, p = 0.314).   
It was considered that that results might have been 
skewed by the high proportion of respondents in the 
‘Computer or IT professional’ category (35% of 
respondents), who could be more or less likely to use 
Bluetooth features than other respondents.  Statistical 
analysis again revealed no significant correlation 
between respondents membership of this category and 
their use of Bluetooth, however (χ2 = 4.802, 
p = 0.187). 
Some functions were considerably more popular 
than others.  Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of 
Bluetooth users who used each function.  The most 
popular application is transferring files between mobile 
phone and PC.  It is likely that transferring ring-tones 
is partly responsible for this, as well as the prevalence 
of cameras in mobile phones leading to the transfer of 
photographs to the user’s PC. 
 












Figure 1. Relative popularity of Bluetooth 
functions 
 
Only two functions were reported by a majority of 
Bluetooth users: uploading and downloading files, and 
using a headset or hands-free device.  The marked 
difference in popularity between different applications 
also supports the hypothesis that a considerable 
proportion of users are required to enable services they 
do not use.   
To further explore this problem, a range of phones 
were tested to determine which profiles that may pose 
more serious security risks were advertised.  Results of 
this testing are summarised in Table 3.  None of the 
devices tested allowed users to configure individual 
profiles, yet all devices advertised a range of profiles 
that are unlikely to all be required. 
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Compaq iPaq  Y   Y 
I-mate PDA Y Y   Y 
LG KE970 Y Y    
LG TU 550  Y Y  Y 
Motorola RAZR 
maxxV6 
Y Y    
Motorola V360 Y Y    
Motorola V3i Y Y    
Nokia 6120 Classic Y Y Y   
Nokia 6280 Y Y Y Y Y 
Nokia 6600 Y Y  Y Y 
Sony Ericsson K610i Y Y  Y Y 
 
Most alarming about these results is the popularity 
of the Dial-Up Networking profile.  33% of Bluetooth 
devices detected in a field study [7] advertised the 
Dialup Networking service and nine of the eleven 
devices tested also advertised this service if Bluetooth 
was enabled, yet only 9% of the Bluetooth users in this 
survey reported actually using this service.  Clearly, 
this presents an unnecessary risk for a large number of 
devices.  Other profiles also appear to present 
unnecessary risks to lesser degrees. 
Also alarming in these figures is the popularity of 
the Serial Port Profile (SPP), which provides the basis 
for a number of other profiles including SIM Access, 
Dial-up Networking, File Transfer Profile and 
Synchronization Profile.  Thus, even if SPP is not used 
specifically, compromising this profile might allow an 
attacker the ability to compromise these other services. 
A last, interesting footnote in the data is that one 
respondent who reported “Other” Bluetooth uses 
explicitly specified “Bluesniffing, BlueSnarfing and 
Bluejacking” as the other purposes for which they used 
it.  While a single respondent obviously has no 
statistical significance, this serves to amplify the 




The security of mobile/cell phone and similar 
devices could be improved by allowing the user to turn 
off individual profiles, and we recommend that device 
manufacturers provide this functionality in user 
interfaces.  This will help to provide a more secure 
platform for the wide range of applications for which 
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